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images can increase judgments of an articleʼs scientific reasoning, the hypotheses that brain scans make
research appear more interesting, surprising, or worthy of funding have not been tested. Neither has the
relation between the allure of brain imaging and dualism. In the following three studies, laypersons rated
both fictional research descriptions and real science news articles accompanied by brain scans, bar
charts, or photographs. Across 988 participants, we found little evidence of neuroimagingʼs seductive
allure or of its relation to self-professed dualistic beliefs. These results, taken together with other recent
null findings, suggest that brain images are less powerful than has been argued.
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Look Again: Effects of Brain Images and Mind–Brain
Dualism on Lay Evaluations of Research
Cayce J. Hook and Martha J. Farah

Abstract
■ Brain scans have frequently been credited with uniquely se-

ductive and persuasive qualities, leading to claims that fMRI research receives a disproportionate share of public attention and
funding. It has been suggested that functional brain images are
fascinating because they contradict dualist beliefs regarding the
relationship between the body and the mind. Although previous
research has indicated that brain images can increase judgments
of an articleʼs scientific reasoning, the hypotheses that brain scans
make research appear more interesting, surprising, or worthy of

INTRODUCTION
In their classic article entitled “Seeing Is Believing,”
McCabe and Castel (2008) presented evidence that scientific texts accompanied by fMRI images are perceived as
more credible than texts accompanied by other graphical
representations of the data. This effect was found when
participants rated fictional research descriptions including intentionally flawed reasoning, as well as when participants rated a BBC article about a real research study.
Across three experiments, comparing illustrations of fMRI
to bar charts, a topographic map of EEG results, or no
image, readers consistently rated the scientific reasoning
more highly when associated with fMRI. The authors concluded that “there is something particularly persuasive
about brain images with respect to conferring credibility
to cognitive neuroscience data” and that “part of the scientific credibility of brain imaging as a research technique lies
in the images themselves” (pp. 349–350).
Well before these findings were published, numerous
authors remarked on neuroimagingʼs apparent hold on
the public imagination: Neuroimaging was variously characterized as “seductive” (Illes, De Vries, Cho, & SchraedleyDesmond, 2006, p. W27; Check, 2005, p. 254; Brammer,
2003, p. 373; Gerard & Peterson, 2003, p. 13; Merckelbach,
Devilly, & Rassin, 2002, p. 492; Gordon, 2001, p. 104;
Ratcliff, 1998, p. 129; Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996,
p. 13), “dazzling” (Blakeslee, 2000, para. 1; Nicholson,
2006, para. 4; The Lancet, February 2004, p. 71, as cited
in Lee, Broderick, & Chamberlain, 2007), and “alluring”
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funding have not been tested. Neither has the relation between
the allure of brain imaging and dualism. In the following three
studies, laypersons rated both fictional research descriptions
and real science news articles accompanied by brain scans, bar
charts, or photographs. Across 988 participants, we found little
evidence of neuroimagingʼs seductive allure or of its relation to
self-professed dualistic beliefs. These results, taken together with
other recent null findings, suggest that brain images are less
powerful than has been argued. ■

(Khoshbin & Khoshbin, 2007, p. 182; Silbersweig & Stern,
2001, p. 1; Callicott & Weinberger, 1999, p. 120). In the
years since, McCabe and Castelʼs (2008) article has received
over 200 citations according to Google Scholar, and it
has provided support for some strong denunciations of
imaging research. For example, Crawford (2008) refers to
neuroimaging as “that fast-acting solvent of critical faculties” (p. 65); more recently, Poole (2012) wrote that “the
[fMRI] pictures, like religious icons, inspire uncritical devotion” (para. 18).
Brain imagingʼs alleged power to sway opinion could
potentially affect more than just judgments of researchersʼ
reasoning. According to Paul Bloom (2006), “Psychologists
can be heard grousing that the only way to publish in
Science or Nature is with pretty color pictures of the brain.
The media, critical funding decisions, precious column
inches, tenure posts, science credibility and the popular
imagination have all been influenced by fMRIʼs seductive
but deceptive grasp on our attentions.” (para. 6). Weisberg
(2008) worries that “the research that produces the prettiest pictures or is performed with the most expensive
equipment…galvanizes public opinion, earns grants, and
changes the shape of the debate” (p. 54).
As brain imaging finds new applications outside cognitive neuroscience research, its seductive allure may
create new problems. Writing about the use of functional
brain images in the courtroom, Khoshbin and Khoshbin
(2007) caution that they are “particularly vulnerable to
misuse because they are so attractive” (p. 171) and Marks
(2010) warns of similar dangers in national security applications: “Given the seductive allure of neuroscientific
explanations and colorful brain images, neuroscience … is
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25:9, pp. 1397–1405
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particularly vulnerable to abuse” (p. 4). Johnson, Blum, and
Giedd (2009) express concern over “the mistaken impression that fMRI, in particular, is an infallible mind-reading
technique that can be used to establish guilt or innocence,
infer ‘true intentions,’ detect lies, or establish competency
to drive, vote, or consent to marriage.” Illes et al. (2010)
write of “the potential for brain scan images to create biases
in the laboratory, the clinic and the courtroom” (p. 61).
Given the popularity of the “seductive allure” hypothesis concerning brain images, published replications and
extensions of McCabe and Castelʼs studies are surprisingly
scarce. To our knowledge, until this year, only two published studies further investigated the effect of brain images
on ratings of scientific reasoning. Keehner, Mayberry, and
Fischer (2011) examined the effects of different types of
brain image on ratings of scientific credibility (compared
with one another, without a nonbrain image control condition). They included five different types of functional brain
images (glass brain, axial slice, 3-D brain, inflated brain, and
ERP scalp topography) and assessed the effects of four
image characteristics (subject-rated image complexity,
realism, three dimensionality, and familiarity) on judgments of reasoning. Only three dimensionality was observed to have a significant effect, only when uncorrected
for multiple comparisons, providing indirect and weak
support for the hypothesis that brain images are persuasive. More recently, Gruber and Dickerson (2012) asked
undergraduates to rate the credibility and quality of reasoning of a fictional science article accompanied by no image, a
functional brain image, or other types of images. They
failed to find an effect of image type on studentsʼ ratings
of the research.
Outside the domain of research evaluation, several studies have examined the influence of brain imaging on juror
decision-making. Gurley and Marcus (2008) found that
participants were more likely to render a verdict of “not
guilty by reason of insanity” if defendants had a prior history of psychiatric disorder or neurological damage. However, the brain images were always accompanied by
additional written testimony in this study, so the influential
factor may have been the testimony, and not the brain
images per se. McCabe, Castel, and Rhodes (2011) examined the effects of various types of lie detection evidence
on juror decision-making and found that participants rendered more guilty verdicts when fMRI evidence was described than when polygraphs, thermal face imaging, or
no lie detection method were described instead (although
the effect disappeared when the lie detection methods
were criticized in a cross examination). Note that in this
case brain images were not shown, and the information
associated with the lie detection conditions differed (e.g.,
activation of frontal lobes for fMRI, rise in facial temperature for thermal imaging). The finding speaks directly to
juror views of neuroscience evidence, but its relevance to
brain images more specifically remains unclear.
The uncertainty left by McCabe and colleaguesʼ (2011)
study is addressed by two other recent studies of juror
1398
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decision-making and brain images. Schweitzer and Saks
(2011) and Schweitzer et al. (2011) found that, although
jurors found neuroscience-based testimony more convincing than non-neuroscience-based testimony, brain images
had no additional effects on juror decision-making over
and above the text-based expert testimony they accompanied. Similarly, Greene and Cahill (2012) found that brain
images had no greater impact than neuropsychological evidence on sentencing recommendations. Taken together,
the evidence seems to suggest that expert neuroscience
testimony can influence jurors, but brain images themselves play a small role, if any.
In the following studies, we attempted to conceptually
replicate and expand upon the “seeing is believing” effect
of brain images. Specifically, we tested claims that have
been made concerning the disproportionate influence
of fMRI on allocation of resources and public interest
by collecting ratings of worthiness of funding, innovativeness, interest, and surprise for articles accompanied by
brain scans, photographs, and bar charts.
We also tested a hypothesis concerning the reason for
the publicʼs fascination with fMRI, namely mind–brain
dualism. As Bloom (2006) has put it, “we intuitively think
of ourselves as nonphysical, and so it is a shock, and endlessly interesting, to see our brains at work in the act of
thinking… So, when a New York Times article rhapsodized about neural correlates of passion (‘Watching
New Love As It Sears the Brain’), the interest of the article
for the average reader did not lie in the details about the
role of the caudate nucleus. Rather, it lay in the fact that
the brain is involved at all in anything as interesting and
personal as falling in love” (para. 8). According to a New
York Times article on fMRI, the “the sheer delight, the
true amazement” people feel when viewing brain images
is attributable to their surprise “that there is a measurable
physical response in the brain” to love, jealousy, and
other seemingly “magic” phenomena (Lucy Brown,
quoted in Carey, 2006, para. 11). Given that beliefs about
the relationship between the mind and brain vary from
person to person, we hypothesized that brain images
would elicit different responses from people who express
dualist versus physicalist beliefs.

EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) and were paid 50 cents for their participation, a typical compensation rate for the site. MTurk samples tend to be younger, more female, and more highly
educated than the general U.S. population, as well as
reporting lower annual income (Paolacci, Chandler, &
Ipeirotis, 2010). Nonetheless, studies indicate that MTurk
samples are at least as diverse as traditional university
and Internet samples, and the data obtained from these
Volume 25, Number 9

subject pools are comparable (e.g., Mason & Suri, 2012;
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). For example, a
well-known study by Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson,
and Gray (2008), pertaining to the effects of neuroscience information on judgments of reasoning, was
recently replicated using an MTurk sample (Michael,
Newman, Vuorre, Cumming, & Garry, 2013).
In an effort to minimize comprehension problems, we
recruited only U.S. residents. The study included 180 participants (124 women, 56 men; median age = 31 years,
range = 18–70 years). One hundred seventy-five (97.2%)
were native English speakers; 63% reported holding a college degree or higher, 30% reported having completed
some college, and 7% reported having completed high
school or less. Gender, age, and education levels were thus
biased in ways characteristic of the MTurk population.
Although these biases limit the generalizability of our
results; this sample is nevertheless more diverse than the
undergraduate student samples used in previous studies
(e.g., Keehner et al., 2011; McCabe & Castel, 2008).
Materials
Three four- to five-sentence fictional research descriptions were created: “Sleep and Memory,” “Videogames
and Attention,” and “Obesity and Self Control.” Appropriate fMRI images and photographs were selected from

academic journals and stock photo Web sites, and bar
charts were created to represent the fictional results.
All texts described plausible research experiments, and
all images bore identical captions (e.g., Figure 1).
For each research description, there were five rating
scales, presented as 100-point slider scales with 0 labeled
as “strongly disagree” and 100 as “strongly agree.” Ratings
were elicited for reasoning, as in McCabe and Castelʼs
(2008) study, with the statement “The scientific reasoning in the article made sense.” In addition, four other
qualities were rated: interest (“This research is interesting”), surprise (“This studyʼs finding is surprising”), innovation (“This research is innovative”), and worthiness of
funding (“This research is worthy of taxpayer funding”).
Our dualism scale was composed of items from two
published dualism scales, selected for being as easy to
understand as possible (in the authorsʼ judgments).
From the four-statement survey described by Demertzi
et al. (2009), we used the following three items: “The
mind is fundamentally physical” (reverse coded), “Some
spiritual part of us survives after death,” and “Each of us
has a soul that is separate from the body.” We excluded
the item “The mind and brain are two separate things,”
because we felt it might be subject to multiple interpretations. We also included four statements from Stanovichʼs
(1989) 27-item dualism scale, selected for being relatively unambiguous yet describing dualism in different

Figure 1. Sample stimuli from
Experiment 1. Participants
were shown one of three
image types accompanied
by the following text:
Obesity and Self-Control
In a recent study, individuals
were given the choice to eat
snacks right now or receive
monetary compensation later.
On average, obese participants
were more likely to choose
snacks over money than thin
participants. Researchers
reported that when shown
images of food, obese
participants had reduced
activity in prefrontal cortex,
a brain area associated
with impulse control. The
researchers concluded that
obese individuals have
more trouble resisting the
urge to eat.
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ways: “All mental processes are the result of activity in the
nervous system” (reverse coded), “When I use the word
‘mind,’ it is just a shorthand term for the complicated
things my brain does” (reverse coded), “The mind is a
nonmaterial substance that interacts with the brain to
determine behavior,” and “Minds are inside brains but
not the same as brains.”
A brief demographic questionnaire elicited gender, age,
native language (text box), race/ethnicity (text box), level
of education (choices were: Less than high school, High
school diploma, Some college, College degree, Some
graduate school, Masterʼs degree, or Doctorate or professional degree: Ph.D., M.D., J.D.), religious background
(text box). Finally, an assessment of theism was phrased
as “Please indicate the extent to which you believe in the
existence of a Supreme Being or God (or supreme beings/
Gods)” and answered with a 100-point slider scale from
“not at all” to “very strongly.”
Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following three image conditions: fMRI scans, stock photographs,
or bar charts. That is, each participant read and evaluated
the articles accompanied by a single type of image.
Participants were informed that the investigators were
interested in understanding peopleʼs attitudes toward
different types of research. They first responded to the
seven-item dualism questionnaire. One of the three research descriptions was then presented at random. To
verify that participants paid sufficient attention to the
task, after participants finished reading the text, another
screen asked participants to provide a brief summary of
what they had read. Participants were again presented
with the text and image (fMRI, photo, or bar chart) and
asked to rate the research on the five dimensions listed
above. This process was then repeated with the remaining two texts. After they had read and rated all three
research descriptions, participants responded to the demographic information questions.
Results and Discussion
Before examining participantsʼ ratings of the articles, the
first author reviewed participantsʼ responses to the article
summary questions for evidence of attention to the task.
Although the responses differed in their level of detail, all
contained a minimum of one complete sentence describing the studyʼs conclusion.
Responses to the dualism scale were analyzed for reliability. Cronbachʼs alpha for the scale from the current
sample was .817, and all item–test correlations were between .4 and .7. Responses to the seven dualism items
were then averaged to create a single dualism score for
each participant (with scores close to 0 reflecting physicalism and scores close to 100 reflecting dualism). Dualism score was significantly correlated with strength of
1400
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belief in a supreme being, god or gods (r = .613, p <
.001), but not with educational attainment (r = −0.059,
p = .429). Strong physicalist views were more common
than strong dualist views, with 21 participants scoring
below 15 (strongly physicalist) but only one participant
scoring above 85 (strongly dualist). One third of the
sample scored between 40 and 60, indicating relatively
equal agreement with both physicalist and dualist statements. Rather than splitting participants along the median and filling each of two groups with participants having
similar dualism scores, we classified participants scoring
in the lowest third as “physicalists” (score range = 0–34),
those in the top third as “dualists” (score range = 53.29–
85.71), and those in the middle third as “intermediate”
(score range = 34.71–53).
Ratings for “interesting,” “surprising,” “innovative,”
“reasoning,” and “worthy of funding” were averaged
across the three research descriptions to create five dependent variables for each participant.
A two-way MANOVA (image condition, dualism group)
revealed a statistically significant difference in ratings of
research among the three image conditions, F(10, 334) =
2.635, p < .005; Wilkʼs λ = 0.859, partial η2 = .073. There
was also a significant effect of dualism, F(10, 334) = 2.399,
p < .01; Wilkʼs λ = 0.87, partial η2 = .067. However, there
was no interaction between image condition and dualism,
F(20, 662) = .437, p = .986; Wilkʼs λ = 0.949, partial η2 =
.013), indicating that the overall effect of image type on
ratings was no different for physicalists and dualists.
A priori pairwise multivariate contrasts indicated significant differences between the fMRI and photo conditions,
F(5, 113) = 2.8, p = .02, Hotellingʼs T2 = 14.76, as well as
the fMRI and chart conditions, F(5, 111) = 3.81, p = .003,
Hotellingʼs T2 = 19.78, and no significant difference between the photo and chart conditions, F(5, 118) = 1.94,
p > .09, Hotellingʼs T2 = 10.00, suggesting that the overall
evaluation of research descriptions was more positive in the
presence of an fMRI image than either a photo or bar chart,
when all dependent measures are considered together.
Means for each dimension of research evaluation by
each image condition and dualism group are shown in
Table 1. To test the “seeing is believing” hypothesis, we
used a two-way ANOVA to assess the effects of image type
on judgments of reasoning. This analysis yielded no significant effect of image condition, dualism, or their interaction
on participantsʼ ratings of scientific reasoning, F(2, 171) =
1.67, p = .19. Additional ANOVAs were carried out to
determine whether an effect of image condition, dualism,
or their interaction held for any of the other dimensions
of research evaluation. There were significant effects of
image condition on “interesting,” F(2, 171) = 5.05, p <
.01, “innovative,” F(2, 171) = 6.29, p < .005, and “worthy
of funding,” F(2, 171) = 4.81, p < .01, but not for “surprising,” F(2, 171) = 2.34, p = .099. Dualism group had
a significant effect on ratings of funding-worthiness,
F(2, 171) = 5.45, p < .01, but not on “surprising” or any of
the other dependent variables (all ps > .2), and there
Volume 25, Number 9

Table 1. Mean Ratings of the Three Articles Presented in Experiment 1 As A Function of Image Type and Dualism Group
Interesting

Surprising

Innovative

Reasoning

Funding

fMRI, n = 56

78.05 (14.82)

39.03 (16.04)

54.92 (18.48)

77.61 (18.38)

53.70 (23.75)

Photo, n = 63

70.37 (15.81)

41.63 (18.25)

49.13 (21.17)

71.80 (17.60)

45.95 (24.29)

Chart, n = 61

69.70 (15.72)

34.70 (15.49)

42.42 (16.71)

74.64 (16.19)

40.81 (23.65)

Dualists, n = 60

72.78 (15.41)

37.78 (18.50)

49.06 (18.76)

76.21 (17.46)

45.15 (23.33)

Intermediate, n = 60

73.89 (15.24)

41.46 (16.24)

49.76 (20.14)

73.31 (15.46)

40.85 (22.99)

Physicalists, n = 60

70.91 (16.93)

36.17 (15.46)

47.15 (19.75)

74.19 (19.38)

53.86 (25.21)

Standard deviations in parentheses.

were no significant interactions between image condition
and dualism group (all ps > .1).
Planned comparisons were carried out to determine
whether fMRI improved ratings relative to the other
two image conditions. This was the case for ratings of
interestingness: texts with fMRI images were rated as
more interesting than those with photographs or bar
charts, t = 2.73, p < .01 and t = 2.81, p < .01, respectively. Additionally, the fMRI condition was rated as more
innovative, t = 3.54, p = .001, and worthy of funding, t =
3.1, p < .005, than the bar chart condition, but not the
photo condition (both p > .8).
Differences between dualism groups were tested using
Tukeyʼs post hoc comparisons. The only difference that
was statistically significant was physicalistsʼ higher rating
of funding worthiness compared with intermediate participants ( p < .01).
The results of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis
that fMRI images add appeal to short descriptions of research. However, we did not find an effect of image type
on judgments of scientific reasoning. Compared with
photos, fMRI improved the rating of only one dimension
of five: interestingness. The hypothesis that dualism is
partly responsible for the appeal of brain images was also
not supported. Although our measure of dualism had
good internal consistency and showed a strong positive
relation to theism, it did not predict the effect of brain
images on evaluations of research.

EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment was a new attempt to test the
“seeing is believing” effect and its moderation by dualism.
To increase our ability to find these effects, we made the
following changes. In light of the statements about brain
imaging and dualism quoted above, one might expect
brain images to be more striking, fascinating, and persuasive when they illustrate the neural bases of more emotional and personal aspects the mind; we therefore
substituted real science news stories relevant to temptation, love, pain, and bullying for the more emotionally
neutral topics used in Experiment 1. In addition, we
changed our measure of dualism to capture different

and possibly more relevant aspects of dualism. We also
increased the sample size and dropped the bar chart condition, resulting in almost twice as many participants in
each of the brain image and photo conditions.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred U.S. residents initially participated. Six participants were excluded after their responses indicated a
failure to read the articles, leaving 194 participants (106
men, 87 women, 1 unreported; median age = 29 years;
range = 17–80 years). As in Experiment 1, participants
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were
paid 50 cents for their participation. The majority were native English speakers (97.9%); 53% had completed college
or higher, 36% had attended some college, 10% had a high
school diploma, one had not completed high school, and
one did not report an education level.
Materials and Procedure
Three articles, “Obese May Be Less Able to Control Food
Impulses,” “Pain May Be Pleasurable for Some Bullies,”
and “Baby Love May Be Hard-Wired in Human Brain,”
were selected from on-line news sources (Reuters, ABC
News, and MSNBC, respectively) and were edited to a
length of approximately 400 words. fMRI images were
retrieved from the journal articles described in each news
piece, and complementary photographs were selected
from stock photo websites (Figure 2).
Participants responded to the same statements as in
Experiment 1, with the following modifications. The
funding question was changed to “This research is
worthy of taxpayer funding (e.g., through organizations
such as the National Institutes of Health).” In addition,
to more closely match the outcome measure used in
McCabe and Castelʼs (2008) Experiment 3, which examined the effect of fMRI images on judgments of a real
news article, we changed the wording of the “scientific
reasoning” question to the following: “Do you agree or
disagree with the articleʼs conclusion that [obese people
may be less able to shut off the parts of the brain that
Hook and Farah

1401

Figure 2. Sample images
from Experiment 2.

drive food cravings?]/[young people with conduct disorder enjoy seeing others in pain and lack the ability to
control potentially inappropriate emotions?]/[the lure of
babies stems from specific brain circuits?]”
We modified the dualism scale to include the following
five items: “Though our bodies die, our minds (consciousness, memory, will) can survive” (adapted from
Bloom, 2006); “Some nonmaterial part of me (my mind,
soul, or spirit) determines my behavior”; “All of my conscious experience is the result of activity in my nervous
system” (reverse coded); “My mind (consciousness, memory, will) is an emergent property of my brain and cannot
be separated from it” (reverse coded); and “The mind and
the brain are the same thing. When I use the word ‘mind,’
it is just a shorthand term for the things my brain does”
(reverse coded; adapted from Stanovich, 1989).
The procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to that of
Experiment 1, with two changes: participants rated each
article on a 5-point scale, and the modified dualism questionnaire was presented randomly either before or after
the three articles.
Results and Discussion
Participantsʼ responses to the article summary questions
were reviewed by the first author. Participants whose responses consisted of one or two words (such as “good”

or “more brains”), random keystrokes (such as “kl;a;
kldd”), or statements irrelevant to the articles (e.g.,
“There are alot of people with bad health problems”)
were excluded from analysis (n = 6), leaving 194
participants.
Ratings of the three articles were averaged to create
five dependent variables per participant. Responses to the
dualism scale were confirmed to be reliable (Cronbachʼs
alpha = .828; all item-scale correlations between .56 and
.7) and were then averaged to create a single dualism score
for each participant. As in Experiment 1, dualism was
significantly correlated with theism (r = .54, p < .001),
but not with educational attainment (r = −.013, p > .8).
Participants were classified by thirds as before: “physicalists” (score range = 1.0–2.2), “dualists” (score range =
3.0–5.0), and “intermediate” (score range = 2.2–3.0).
Means for each dimension of research evaluation by
image condition and dualism group are shown in Table 2.
In contrast to the results of the previous experiment, a
two-way MANOVA revealed no effect of Image Type, F(5,
184) = .958, p > .4 (Wilkʼs λ = 0.975, partial ε2 = .025),
on overall evaluation of research. There was a significant
effect of Dualism Group on overall ratings, F(10, 368) =
2.092, p < .05 ( Wilkʼs λ = .895, partial ε2 = .054), but
no interaction between Image Condition and Dualism
Group, F(10, 368) = .672, p > .7 (Wilkʼs λ = .964, partial
ε2 = .018).

Table 2. Mean Ratings of the Three Articles Presented in Experiment 2 As A Function of Image Type and Dualism Group
Interesting

Surprising

Innovative

Worthy of Funding

Agree with Conclusion

fMRI, n = 98

3.6 (.70)

2.47 (.89)

3.22 (.80)

3.03 (.91)

3.75 (.64)

Photo, n = 96

3.46 (.76)

2.30 (.72)

3.04 (.74)

2.85 (1.10)

3.80 (.61)

Dualists, n = 65

3.60 (.72)

2.45 (.77)

3.16 (.75)

2.80 (1.09)

3.57 (.69)

Intermediate, n = 64

3.48 (.72)

2.38 (.86)

3.07 (.77)

2.91 (.97)

3.89 (.58)

Physicalists, n = 65

3.51 (.76)

2.33 (.82)

3.17 (.82)

3.11 (.94)

3.86 (.56)

Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Two-way ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of Dualism Group on “agreement with conclusion,” F(2, 188) =
5.082, p < .01; Tukeyʼs post hoc comparisons indicated
that dualists expressed significantly lower levels of agreement with the conclusions of the articles than both physicalists ( p = .023) and intermediates ( p = .013). There
were no other significant effects (all ps > .09).
In contrast to the first experiment, in this larger experiment, we did not find an effect of fMRI on laypersonsʼ
overall evaluation of research nor their judgments of
any one of the five dimensions rated. Dualists were no
more likely to be influenced by fMRI than physicalists
(although overall they were less convinced of the stated
research conclusions than physicalists).
In summary, whereas the first two studies are consistent regarding the lack of interaction between dualism
and image condition, they partially diverge on the effect
of fMRI itself. Neither experiment replicated the “seeing
is believing” effect on judgments of scientific reasoning,
but the first experiment demonstrated an effect of image
condition overall and enhanced evaluation of “interestingness” with fMRI compared with photos, whereas the
second experiment did not. To better understand the
effects of fMRI images on the evaluation of research,
we undertook a third experiment, with an even larger
sample and hence increased power.

EXPERIMENT 3
Methods
Participants
Six hundred sixty-eight U.S. residents initially participated. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid 50 cents for their participation.
MTurk users who completed Study 2 were prevented
from participating in Study 3. Fifty-four participantsʼ responses were judged inadequate according to the criteria
listed above; these data were excluded from analysis,
leaving 614 participants (374 women, 239 men, 1 unreported; median age = 29 years, range = 18–74 years).
Native language and educational attainment were similar
to those in Experiment 2.

Materials and Procedure
The materials were identical to those in Experiment 2,
with two exceptions: A bar chart condition was added,
and participants were only asked the questions pertaining to interestingness, worthiness of taxpayer funding,
and agreement with conclusion. We chose to focus on
these outcomes because interestingness showed the
strongest effects in Experiment 1 and because credibility
and funding worthiness have been most discussed in the
previous literature. Display order of the dualism scale
(before or after reading the three articles) was recorded
and analyzed.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for
each dimension of research evaluation by Image Condition and Dualism Group. As in Experiment 2, two-way
MANOVA revealed a significant effect of Dualism Group
on ratings of research, F(6, 1206) = 6.25, p < .0005
( Wilkʼs λ = .94, partial η2 = .03), no effect of Image Condition, F(6, 1206) = .826, p > .5 (Wilkʼs λ = .992, partial
η2 = .004), and no interaction, F(12, 1595.68) = 1.23,
p > .2 ( Wilkʼs λ = .976, partial η2 = .008).
Two-way ANOVAs were carried out to examine the
effects of Image Type and Dualism Group on the three
dependent variables separately. Again, Image Type had
no significant effect on judgments of credibility or any
other ratings of research, all Fs ≤ 1, all ps > .3.
There were significant effects of Dualism on ratings of
funding worthiness and agreement with conclusion [F(2,
605) = 8.885, p < .0005 and F(2, 605) = 5.39, p = .005,
respectively] and no interactions (all Fs < 1.5, all ps >
.2). Tukeyʼs post hoc analyses revealed that regardless
of image type, physicalists rated research as significantly
more worthy of funding than dualists and intermediates
( p < .0005; p < .05) and agreed more strongly with the
articlesʼ conclusions than dualists ( p < .005).
There was a small but statistically significant effect of
the order in which the dualism scale was presented on
participantsʼ dualism scores, such that participants who
answered the dualism scale before reading the three

Table 3. Mean Ratings of the Three Articles Presented in Experiment 3 As A Function of Image Type and Dualism Group
Interesting

Worthy of Funding

Agree with Conclusion

fMRI, n = 198

3.65 (.64)

3.12 (.89)

3.72 (.62)

Photo, n = 203

3.61 (.77)

3.13 (.90)

3.74 (.68)

Chart, n = 213

3.64 (.65)

3.06 (.94)

3.67 (.64)

Dualists, n = 205

3.66 (.72)

2.94 (.89)

3.61 (.69)

Intermediate, n = 204

3.61 (.71)

3.07 (.86)

3.69 (.56)

Physicalists, n = 205

3.63 (.63)

3.3 (.94)

3.82 (.66)

Standard deviations in parentheses.
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articles tended to agree more with dualist statements
than those who answered the questions after reading
the three articles (t = 2.21, p < .05; means = 2.84 and
2.69, respectively). This is consistent with the articlesʼ focus on cognitive neuroscience priming physicalist beliefs.
As in the previous two experiments, dualism scores were
significantly correlated with religiosity (r = .57, p < .001)
but not with educational attainment (r = −.04, p > .2).

GENERAL DISCUSSION
It is widely believed that brain images are overly influential. Much to our surprise, our findings did not support
this view. Across three experiments with a total of 988
participants, we found no evidence for the “seeing is believing” effect of brain scans. One of the experiments
showed that fMRI enhanced laypersonsʼ overall evaluations of research, but this effect was absent in the two
larger experiments, and in no study was the research in
question viewed as more credible when accompanied by
a brain image.
Under these circumstances, the question of whether
dualism is in part responsible for the allure of brain imaging is largely moot, and indeed we failed to find differences in the effect of imaging as a function of dualist
belief. An unexpected finding was the trend across experiments for physicalists to be more in favor of funding
the research described and more inclined to agree with
the reasoning or conclusions.
It is worth noting that we only assessed overt dualism;
the possibility remains that covert dualistic intuitions
could influence perceptions of brain images. However,
in that case, we might expect articles accompanied by
brain images to be judged as more surprising than those
without; this hypothesis was also not confirmed.
The present results do not address the broader question
of whether neuroscience in general is overly influential.
Weisberg et al. (2008) argued that it may be, at least when
poor explanations of psychological phenomena are being
evaluated. Their research demonstrated that poor explanations were judged more satisfying when they included
references to neuroscience, even when the neuroscience
information was superfluous. On the other hand, adding
irrelevant neuroscience information to “good” explanations had no significant effect on laypersonsʼ judgments.
In contrast to the stimuli used by Weisberg et al.
(2008) and some of those used by McCabe and Castel
(2008), none of the texts we used contained reasoning
errors. Our finding that brain images did not influence
ratings of credibility is thus not inconsistent with the findings reported by Weisberg et al. (2008). However, our
findings contradict those of McCabe and Castelʼs (2008)
Experiment 3, in which the addition of a brain image
improved judgments of credibility for a real news article
that contained no logical errors.
Other recent replication attempts cast further doubt on
the persuasive power of brain images. Michael et al.
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(2013) conducted 10 direct replications of McCabe and
Castelʼs (2008) Experiment 3. A meta-analysis including
these and McCabe and Castelʼs original results found that
brain images exerted “little to no influence” on judgments
of credibility. Schweitzer, Baker, and Risko (submitted)
report three experiments, including one near-direct replication, none of which found an effect of brain images
on judgment.
Has the public simply grown more savvy about neuroscience in recent years? That the findings of Weisberg
et al. (2008) can still be successfully replicated suggests that
this is not the case (Michael et al., 2013). Instead, it seems
that neuroscience evidence may enhance the credibility of
poorly reasoned arguments, even if brain images per se
do not. This interpretation is consistent with several
recent studies on juror decision-making, discussed above,
which found that, although neuroscience-based testimony
can be persuasive, brain images themselves exert little
additional influence. Taken together with these findings,
our results paint a clear picture: When it comes to brain
images, seeing is not necessarily believing.
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